Alan Thornett

Alan Thornett: 15 June 1937 – 9 October 2026

A Question of Leadership: Alan Thornett's contributions

Recorded talk: A Question of Leadership, documentary film by Ken Loach (1981), 1980 (filmed discussion August 1980); film released 1981

Ken Loach's documentary A Question of Leadership was made after the 13-week national steel strike, which ended in April 1980. It has a filmed discussion among steelworkers, miners, car workers and dockers, then a studio discussion with Bill Sirs (General Secretary of the ISTC), George Wright (General Secretary of the Wales TUC), Bernard Connolly and Alan Thornett, then a TGWU shop steward at British Leyland. In the studio he mentions the few months “since we made that film last August”, so the discussion was filmed in August 1980. These are all four of his contributions, from a machine transcription of the film proofread from the text but not yet checked against the audio; his passages were identified by matching voices against his studio answer, where the presenter names him. Timestamps refer to the film. Square brackets mark an editorial insertion.

A corrected transcript of the recording. The recording is the authority.

The Tory strategy

From the filmed discussion, 0:03:38–0:05:07. He follows a speaker who has argued that the government had to "destroy… or demoralise the trade union movement" to carry through its monetary policy.

It's clear that the Tory policy is basically their response to the economic crisis, and the economic crisis is clear enough for everybody to see, obviously.

Therefore I think that when we look at the strategy of the Tory government – I agree with the previous speaker – it isn't a question of picking the weakest union, it's picking those industries which are forced into the front line by the economic crisis. And the Tory government, very quickly after they came to power, taking advantage of Common Market membership, lifted exchange controls on currency, so that capital could be moved more quickly in and out of the country, and created the conditions where, if there's going to be falling production, then that lower level of production is going to be produced in the most profitable areas of the world as far as capitalism is concerned.

And they don't consider Britain to be one of those profitable areas. Therefore what we are seeing, in my opinion, is a run-down of basic sections of industry. And therefore I think that the Tory government had two aims in mind. On the one hand they wanted, as has been said previously, to defeat a large section of the industrial working class, to discipline the working class. [On the other,] they picked a section which was strategically in line with their general economic intentions as far as the economy is concerned.

Isolation, and British Leyland

From the filmed discussion, 0:16:45–0:20:46. He follows the exchange in which an ISTC official explains why the union's Executive called off the strike.

One of the problems – or probably the most central problem – of the steel strike was the problem of isolation: of isolation from other sections of workers coming in to struggle on their own claims. And I would agree with the previous speaker that made the point that the main task of the trade union leaders and the TUC, as they saw it right from the start, was to ensure that only one section of the working class came up against the Tory government at one time, so that workers were carefully parcelled off in manageable sizes, so that there was no development of mass struggle which would go beyond the control of the leaderships.

And therefore I think it is important just to look at what the situation was within British Leyland throughout the steel strike.

The argument that we should be out alongside the steelworkers was an overwhelming argument. We were being taken on by the same employer, Margaret Thatcher. We had the same offer. We were faced with closures in the same way. The two industries were identical, and they were both being confronted as part of the strategy of the Tory government. Therefore it was an overwhelming argument that we should now join the steelworkers and jointly fight the common enemy, which was the Tory government.

The response of the Joint Negotiating Committee to that argument was to call a postal ballot.

A two-to-one majority voted for strike action, in answer to the question: "Are you prepared to reject the offer and take any action, including strike action, in pursuance of the claim?" Two-to-one majority voted for that, under those conditions. This meant that from the first week in February onwards there was a strike decision within BL, taken by the membership in a postal ballot. At that point those of us within BL who wanted to bring BL out alongside the steelworkers began to take some initiatives. We came up to South Yorkshire and met the strike committees and said, look, it's in the interest of the steelworkers and in the interest of BL that we fight together, because if the steelworkers are defeated, there's no way we're going to win.

And equally, if you remain in isolation, you're not going to win. And the response of Michael Edwardes was to announce that he would impose the deal, or impose the package, as from April the 8th, and that anyone that clocked in on April the 8th would be deemed as having accepted the 5%, plus what had now grown to 105 pages of strings attached to the deal.

That put the Joint Negotiating Committee into a position where they could no longer avoid the question. And in fact the Joint Negotiating Committee a few days later met and took a decision to call all BL out from the 8th of April. Well, the connection with BL is extremely close, because of course the Committee of Inquiry, on finding another 1.5%, then said that all steelworkers should be back by – surprise, surprise – April the 8th. And so you had a direct connection with the return to work of the steelworkers. In other words, as soon as the strike was called in BL, there was then a stampede within the steel unions, or the leadership of the steel unions, to bring that strike to a conclusion before BL came out.

And I think it's an important point, because what it shows is that throughout, the trade union leaders – not just of the unions involved, but at TUC level – were determined that there would be no all-out political confrontation with the government, because they have a parliamentary perspective, and they say that the government has a period of office to run and it should not be brought down by strike action by the working class. But the problem with that argument is, if you don't bring it down by strike action from the working class, it's going to run its term – and what is going to be left when that term of office is completed?

The studio discussion

0:44:12–0:45:58. Just before this, Bill Sirs has said the strike "was not about jobs at all" but "about wages, purely and simply", and George Wright has defended the Wales TUC.

Presenter: Alan Thornett, can I put this to you on a wider point? You're not a member of the steel industry. You're in fact a shop steward at British Leyland, but you were, you often said, offered the possibility of having British Leyland workers coming out in sympathy with the steelworkers, perhaps building up a much more widespread national confrontation. From your point of view, that failed.

Alan Thornett: Well, not in sympathy, because the British Leyland workers were faced with a confrontation with the same employer – an attack of a similar nature from the Tory government. I think what was posed in the steel strike wasn't just, as Bill says, a question of wages in the steel industry. It was a set-piece confrontation set up by the Tory government, which involved the whole of the working class and the devastation of the whole of the steel industry. And I think that the problem with the steel strike is that what has come out of it is, on the one hand, thousands more jobs have gone.

On the other hand, we still have Margaret Thatcher and the Tory government, and we can see the results of that even in the few months since we made that film last August. And I think what is posed by the steel strike is: what is the strategy of the trade unions, the trade union leadership, faced with mass unemployment? Are they prepared to use the strength of the working class to confront a government such as the government we have at the present time? Not to use it in the abstract, but to use it when that working class is in action, as it was in the steel strike. And I think the problem with the steel strike was that there was a determination throughout not to broaden that strike into an all-out confrontation with the government.

And the problem then is, if workers are not able to win victories, then demoralisation sets in, and demoralisation is then used as an excuse not to call further action.

Closing clip

0:52:19–0:52:35, from the montage at the end of the film. This wording doesn't appear in the discussion as it survives in the film, so it was probably taken from footage cut from the main edit.

I still think the biggest scandal of the strike was the steelworkers fighting in isolation, under conditions where British Leyland workers had voted for action and the leadership was sitting on that vote and refusing to implement it.

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