Lessons of the steel strike
Socialist Organiser1980sTranscribed by hand from the printed page.
LAST YEAR'S 13-week national steel strike ended with a 16 per cent wage rise tied to further widespread redundancies and productivity deals. It was a sell-out by the leadership of the steel unions, but not a defeat for the steelworkers.
The sell-out formula hurriedly cobbled together by a 'committee of inquiry' at the beginning of April consisted of 11% on the existing rates and a further 4½% available in local productivity settlements — guaranteed for the first four months.
From the first day — the day after the New Year holiday — it was a completely political strike against the Thatcher government, the direct employer of the steel workers.
It was a confrontation deliberately provoked by Thatcher, and in fact planned before the Tories returned to power in May 1979.
The Tory plan was drafted by Nicholas Ridley — a right winger even by Thatcher's standards.
Targeted
He proposed picking off and defeating several significant sections of the working class as an example to the rest. Two sections he named were steel and BL.
They fitted the bill because they were both large, basic, organised sections of the working class. They were both also chronically affected by the general economic decline of British capitalism and the particular policies of Thatcher in driving large sections of basic industry to the wall.
But having targeted the steel workers for special treatment, the Tories were shocked by the response to management's initial 2 per cent offer.
The National Executive of the ISTC ordered a strike — without preparation or even mass meetings — and the response was massive. Within a couple of days the whole of the BSC was out, and thousands of flying pickets were covering ports and steel stockholders throughout the country.
What frightened the trade union leaders, from Sirs to Murray, was that the strike could well bring down the government, something which was unthinkable for these defenders of Parliament and the right of the Tories to run their full constitutional term of office.
It was such politics which presented the steelworkers with their biggest problem — isolation.
It was not an enforced isolation, but an imposed one.
The overwhelming majority position in the TUC was to make the steel workers fight alone, and so avoid a generalised strike movement against Thatcher which would make the next logical step a general strike.
And this policy was ruthlessly put into practice. When the Wales TUC called for an all-Wales general strike in defence of jobs and against government policy, it was stamped on by the TUC in London, ending up as a one-day protest.
When BL workers voted two-to-one for strike action in week 5 of the steel strike, having been offered 5 per cent and 92 pages of strings, the national negotiating committee, heavily influenced by national officers, refused to name a strike date or implement the decision.
Even a joint lobby by large contingents of BL workers and steelworkers failed to shift them.
Six weeks later the BL Joint Negotiating Committee eventually called for an all out strike from April 8th.
Within days the 'court of inquiry' was set up to 'mediate' in the steel dispute and made its recommendations, which were conditional on acceptance by April 8th.
But things had not stood still in BL, either. As soon as the strike call was made, the AUEW, who had been party to the original ballot which had produced a strike vote, decided to do a 'consultation' of its own members.
Contained
The result, said AUEW official Ken Cure, who had 'assessed' the result of the 'consultation', was a majority against a strike. The AUEW then ordered its members to accept the 5%.
Faced with such a split, Edwardes sent out a letter saying that anyone who clocked in on April 8th would be deemed to have accepted the 5%, and anyone who failed to clock in would be sacked.
T&G members who struck in the Midlands were quickly manoeuvred back to work by Moss Evans.
The steel workers had been successfully isolated and contained. They improved the money offer, but the Tory government remained in office and closures and redundancies accelerated in BSC.
Now, a year and a half later, BL workers are in the front line. They face the same political problems of leadership as the steel workers.
Fightback
The union leaders are no more keen to bring down Thatcher by strike action now than they were then.
But a further 18 months of Toryism has had its effects on the working class. Now, with three million on the dole, hundreds more factories closed, and further cuts in the standard of living a fightback is more urgent than ever.