Japan 2: The defeat that shaped Japan's labour relations
Socialist Organiser1980sTranscribed by hand from the printed page.
The first article of this series described how the US set about helping the remilitarisation of Japan after the start of the Cold War. Militant trade unions were repressed, pro-employer organisations encouraged.
THE historic struggle against the new USA/Japan security treaty broke out in 1960. The architect of this treaty was Kishi Nobuska — the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) Prime Minister. He was a member of the Jojo Cabinet which launched the Pacific war in 1941. He was held as a war criminal but later released by the Americans and became leader of the LDP.
When Eisenhower was due to visit Japan to sign the treaty, millions took to the streets demanding the resignation of Kishi and his Cabinet and demanding that the treaty be not signed.
Sohyo (the major progressive trade union federation in Japan) staged strikes and students held mass demonstrations in what was the most important political struggle which had taken place since the war.
Such was the ferocity of the demonstrations that Kishi was forced to resign and Eisenhower's visit cancelled (although of course the treaty was still ratified by the Diet).
High point
The demonstrations were the highpoint of the mass political movement in Japan which had opposed the relentless drive towards remilitarisation and the integration of Japan into the US military system since independence in 1952.
1960 was also a turning point for the trade union movement.
That year saw one of the most important disputes in post-war Japan, the bitter struggle at the Miike pit of the Mitsui coal mining company. The Miike pit was highly organised and the dispute was over rationalisation, redundancy, the power of the union, and the determination of the management to reestablish control.
The union was defeated and 1,200 workers victimised.
It was a very strategic victory for Japanese capitalism. It not only strengthened the employers, but led to a very significant change in the attitude of the independent unions.
The leaders of those unions used the defeat to argue that strikes and a class struggle line on the shop floor were now impossible and far too dangerous, and that grievances must be channelled even more through consultation and procedures.
After that, from 1955 to 1970, Japan achieved an incredibly high rate of economic growth, easily the highest in the world. Wages of workers doubled, trebled and almost quadrupled in the ten years from 1960 to 1970 — although the rate of exploitation was very high and the standard of living still below Western Europe and North America.
Such conditions compounded the retreat of the leaders, worsened the conditions for the progressive unions, and gradually undermined the anti-war movement.
Some unions, however, were still militant and management set out to split them and create yellow unions in their place. Most unions split by the employers faded out. Some were intimidated into becoming right wing unions in order to survive.
Even the Spring offensive, the Shunto, although remaining the main expression of a class struggle line, was contained to a great extent.
Each year the directors from the ten biggest companies would get together to discuss what would be a "reasonable" offer and coordinate their response to the Shunto. The successes of the Shunto in that period were largely due to the economic growth itself.
Shunto
The scope of the Shunto however developed considerably until it became the main vehicle for negotiating wages in Japan. Even Domei negotiated during the spring from 1960, although not strictly as part of the Shunto.
At the time Sohyo and the smaller independent Federation churitsuroren — which stands politically midway between Sohyo and Domei — campaigned on the basis of "parity with Europe".
[Photograph of a car assembly line. Caption: Strong control over the shop floor has enabled Japanese management to modernise rapidly]
A right wing development in that period was the establishment of the International Metalworkers Federation: Japan Council (IMF:JC), which included both Sohyo and Domei unions from that sector and turned into a vehicle to undermine Sohyo and strengthen the Domei line — which was fully developed class collaboration.
They denounced all "shop floor struggle" and advocated consultation on all problems. They argued that management prerogatives on such questions as manning, allocation of work, movement of labour, etc., should be respected. They argued that all wage claims should be "realistic" and consistent with the "national interest".
Although these policies became dominant in the big production industries of the private sector, a progressive line was maintained by Sohyo in parts of the public sector, for example, on the Japanese National Railways and postal services where they retained some control of working conditions.
Overall, however, the 1960s were the most important period in which the employers shaped the class relationships which exist today.
They established a very strong ideological control over the labour force. They established unassailable productivity levels alongside the domination of the trade union movement by the yellow and right wing unions.
In that period Sohyo gradually lost out to Domei, which with the JC unions came to dominate steel, shipbuilding, electrical manufacture and car production. The most important sections of Sohyo membership were left in the public sector where strikes remained illegal.*
These factors alone, however, do not adequately explain the ideological control of Japanese capital over the workers and the situation where strikes are more or less unknown.
One major factor is certainly the enormous strength of Japanese capital in that period and the success of the war against the unions by the Japanese employers. The other factor however is the sophisticated labour relations policies developed by the Japanese employers as a whole.
From a European viewpoint, where historical development has made workers think more readily in class terms this is not easy to understand. The main components of it are:
A). Workers' Participation. By this system, even where independent unions exists, negotiations are channelled towards a consultation system which suits the needs of the employer and discusses things on the employers' terms.
Acceptance
The starting point of consultation is acceptance of management prerogative, and that everything is subordinated to the requirements of production.
B). Paternalism. This is an ideology which projects "guaranteed employment", company houses, company loans and company sports and cultural facilities.
"Guaranteed employment" is in reality a fraud. In the late 1970s hundreds of thousands of workers assumed to be protected were thrown out of their jobs.
Whilst many of the big companies still stick to it to some extent for their direct employees, contract labour — a huge part of the labour force — can be thrown out at will.
Many ways are found by big companies to reduce the workforce — such as letting workers out on loan, dismissal of part-timers, dismissal of temporary workers, voluntary and compulsory redundancy and victimisation of militants.
The most large scale of these is sending workers on compulsory loan.
At Masda for example, over 8,000 regular employees were transferred to Masda dealers for three years between 1975 and 1977.
Nippon Steel transferred hundreds of their steel workers to the Isuzu Motor Company to work on the assembly lines for three months as temporary workers.
Japanese companies seem to have little problem in reducing the labour force when they want to. Masda for example reduced its workforce by 25% between 1974 and 1981 (although its production increased by 60% in the same period).
Yet despite all this the "jobs for life" propaganda is still a part of the paternalistic ideology of most of the big companies.
An even more effective part of paternalism is company home loans.
A worker in a big private company can take a loan to buy a house under an agreement which requires him or her (him in reality) to repay the loan from severance pay when s/he retires at the age of 55.
This ties the worker completely to the fate of the company. It becomes almost impossible to resign from the company since severance pay would be drastically reduced, and repayment impossible. Dismissal becomes a more frightening weapon for the same reason.
Paternalism, which utilises the hierarchical Japanese structure to the advantage of the employer, is at the same time a subtle and effective form of intimidation.
C). The age and merit wage system. (Nen-ko Chingiu).
This has two elements. Firstly, wages rise continuously as a result of length of service. This again has the effect of making it difficult for workers to leave their job, and makes sacking particularly harsh since it means going back to the bottom of the seniority pay ladder after possibly many years service.
The second, wages given for merit, is even more pernicious. Under this, a very large proportion of a worker's wage, varying from company to company, but in some cases as much as 50%, is determined by a performance assessment by management.
Loyalty
The results of this are obvious. The wages of a worker are determined to a large degree by his or her relationship with the foreman, who is the key to the assessment process. The biggest single factor in the assessment is company loyalty.
The worker is forced to display company loyalty in every circumstance in order to advance or retain his or her rate of pay.
D). Small group activity, or QC circles.
By this system, workers, particularly in the big companies are organised into small groups (of between six and twenty workers) in order to discuss quality and productivity and efficiency levels. They are generally held outside of working hours every two weeks or so and are effectively compulsory — at least if they are not in all cases formally compulsory, then it is very difficult for a worker to refuse to participate.
It is very difficult for anyone in Britain who has witnessed the generally unsuccessful or partially successful attempts by British employers to use this system to understand its scale or significance in Japan.
Circles
According to a 1976 survey by the Japan Productivity Centre, 71% of Japanese enterprises had QC circles. Among big enterprises with 10,000 or more workers the figure was 91%. In the steel industry, 30,000 QC circles are operating in 169 mills, factories and offices, involving 230,000 workers.
The small groups make workers think on behalf of the employers in both a practical and an ideological way. They breed competition between workers for the highest productivity. They divide worker from worker and give each a relationship with management.
On top of this the rate of pay is again involved, since a performance assessment for merit payment will be heavily based on the performance of a worker in the QC circle.
They are responsible to an important degree for the phenomenal productivity levels which exist, which require not only coercion but also the active cooperation which is achieved through the small groups.
* In fact Sohyo is bigger than Domei, but its membership far less strategically placed.
Sohyo has a total membership of 4,525,000 of which 1,508,000 are in the private sector and 3,017,000 in the public sector.
Domei has a total membership of 2,182,000, of which 2,016,000 are in the private sector and 165,000 in the public sector.