Force the TUC to call action: the rank and file must make the leaders fight
Socialist Viewpoint1980sTranscribed by hand from the printed page.
[Strapline: NUM must fight for a General Strike! Headline: FORCE TUC TO CALL ACTION! Second deck: Rank and file must make leaders fight!]
THE trickle back to work over the last two weeks does not materially alter the strength and stability of the miners' strike or in any way make it unwinnable, but it is a worrying factor which needs to be dealt with. Despite this, the solidarity of the striking miners remains remarkable. It is now the longest major national strike in the history of the British Trade Union Movement.
Although the tone of the NUM leadership — particularly Arthur Scargill — has changed to some extent to reflect the more difficult conditions the strike now faces, they are standing firm, fighting to maintain the strike and making no concession to the NCB or the government.
This determination, however, is not reflected at every level in either national or area leaderships. There is now a pretty widespread view that the strike cannot now be won and that a compromise deal should be sought to "save the union". This is the unspoken view of the Communist Party and the right wing.
The ruling class are interpreting the situation this way as well. They have felt for some time that they are on a winning streak and have used every weapon at their disposal to break the strike. The present fall in the value of the pound is clearly prominently connected to the miners strike, yet they are bluffing it out and prepared to pay the price, however heavy. They are convinced of the enormous longterm advantage which British capitalism will gain from a resounding defeat of the miners.
This means that despite what any elements within the NUM, or the TUC, or anywhere else may want, no compromise is possible. Not just because the issue itself is so black and white but because Thatcher would not accept a compromise if one were offered.
In these conditions the question of which way forward in the strike — what is the strategy to win — is the most urgent issue. It has been the case for a long time, and now it is hardly debatable, that the miners cannot win alone. The basic strategy of the strike — "keep it solid and eventually the lights will go out" — is not viable.
The most important factor in the strike has been the isolation of the NUM from actual strike support from the rest of the trade union movement. One of the most important reasons for the trickle back to work is the failure to change that situation. A new strategy is now urgently needed to put new life in the strike and put it back on the offensive.
There have always been four possible ways of breaking the isolation.
● There could be straight supporting action by other individual unions or individual sections of workers in other industries, which is the most advanced form of action and very difficult to achieve. It would require a very high level of consciousness for a section of workers simply to join the miners on indefinite strike. In most cases workers would argue that the defence of the miners and the anti-union laws are a mattter for the whole trade union novement and why should it be them to take on the government.
● There could be strike action in defence of workers victimised for supporting the miners — such as the dockers and now rail workers, which is entirely achievable providing the leadership of the union concerned is prepared to stand firm. The employer, however, has the option of backing down or making concessions if they think their action is resulting in a second front for the miners. The victimisation of rail workers for supporting the miners provided a possibility of this but the action on January 17 was very limited. If the BR Board takes the unions to court for damages this could provide a further opportunity.
● Another way has been for other unions who say they support the miners to stick firm on their own issues, thus creating a second front with the miners and putting pressure on the Government. This in the past has been the most achievable and had the possibility on a number of occasions of altering the course of the strike. The problem was that the union leaders concerned were weak on it whilst the Government was fully aware of the implications and have offered small concessions at the last minute. Now the next pay round does not start until the spring.
● The fourth way has been the matter of fighting to force action via the TUC. We saw this as the key issue in September — when the NUM made a serious mistake by simply asking for general abstract support and the blacking of substitute fuels in the power stations — and it has been the key to the situation since.
The action needed now, and we have to say it clearly and unambiguously, is an all out general strike in support of the miners. It is so obvious that this is the make or break issue, yet so many are hesitant to spell it out. Some argue that even if the TUC were to call for a general strike the response would not be there from the rank and file. This is not the case. Not that a general strike could just be called at any random time or in any random way. But if the call came unambiguously from the TUC, at a time when events were taking place which clearly affected the whole movement in historical terms, and the leadership spelled them out, there would be a response. The TUC has tremendous authority in the British Trade Union movement, as was shown with the call for a one day strike over GCHQ. They made the call, with only one working day's notice, spelled out the issues to some extent, and got a response.
There have been several major turning points in this dispute (and there will be more) where this could have been done.
The introduction of the official receiver to take control of NUM finances last December was such a time. Arthur Scargill correctly called it the single most serious attack ever on the British trade union movement. He said quite rightly that it threatened the very existence of the NUM. A general strike call from the TUC would have had a real impact at that time had the TUC spelled it out: but what happened? Absolutely nothing. Not a word from the TUC or any of the trade union leaders, left or right.
The NUM delegate conference turned to the General Council calling for what amounted to a general strike — and were rejected. The only people who took up the call were some of the Labour lefts: Tony Benn, Ken Livingstone, Audrey Wise and Denis Skinner.
The mistake the NUM made over the official receiver was to go to the General Council and not a recall Congress! The two are radicallly different. The General Council rests on the wholly inadequate decisions of the September Congress and nothing will shift them from that. In fact they will not even make any serious attempt to implement those. What is necessary is a new basis on which the fight to support the miners can take place. That involves a change in the official policy of the TUC as a minimum requirement, and that can only be achieved at a recall Congress, not at the General Council.
The key to a recall TUC has to be the NUM. The NUM has to be prepared to call for a recall conference and fight to achieve it. They have to be prepared to put down a hard line resolution calling for a general strike and fight tooth and nail to win it on the floor of the conference. This is the minimum necessary to change TUC policy. It is right for other unions to call for a recall Congress but without the NUM it would not mean very much.
If the NUM were to do this it would be entirely achievable — or at least a compromise resolution which would give the NUM far more support than they have at the present time. The striking miners are by far the most influential force in the labour movement and the authority which they so deservedly have has to be turned on the TUC. It would be difficult to vote against them in a recall Congress.
There is no doubt that getting NUM policy on these lines is a difficult problem. The Scargill leadership is entrenched in its strategy and is not easy to shift. They quite rightly have the respect of their members for the unique stand they are taking. But it is a problem to which we must address ourselves, since it may well be that the outcome of the strike will depend on it.
Another argument against a general strike call is that it would end up in the hands of the General Council and they would either avoid it or call it off quickly. But that is an argument against any general strike call in Britain at any time until there is a unique radical development at the top of the TUC. We can't accept this but we have to be clear that winning a vote on the floor of the TUC Congress would only be round one. The same forces which forced that through would then have to campaign for its implementation and for control of the strike.
Concentration on the fight for a general strike must not detract from limited or localised actions — except where they are a substitute for, or avoidance of, the call for a general strike. Where links can be built between miners and other sections of workers to the extent that some action is possible, it is very important that there is a difference between generalised action which offers a strategic road to victory and limited actions which although important in building up the campaign and developing the political situation cannot of themselves be decisive.
The situation in the power stations needs to be looked at in that context. Picketing of the power stations is a very important aspect of the dispute. The role of the CP, and (to some extent through them) the NUM leadership, in opposing a policy of mass picketing of power stations has weakened the strike, particularly once TUC policy was directed towards the power stations. It deprived the strike of the offensive thrust that mass picketing of power stations could give and deprived it of a very important way of jointly mobilising miners along with activists from the general labour movement in joint direct action.
Despite all this, however, there is no viable road to victory through the mass picketing of power stations alone. It is an important aspect of the strike, but it remains an aspect.
We have argued before why this is the case. It is because it is so difficult to get one small section of workers — coal and oil workers in the power stations — to take the decision to join with the miners and take on the government. Because of the obvious strategic importance of power supply they are placed under tremendous pressure by management which they have to face in isolation. Under those conditions they will generally ask who else is taking that kind of action alongside the miners? Is this not a matter for the whole movement? This is not to excuse workers who are flouting TUC policy, we are quite right to picket them and demand that they honour it and get support from the rest of the movement if they face victimisation, but it is necessary to recognise the real world and the problems resulting from the weakness of the original policy.
This is not to detract from the importance of the continuing struggle to get substitute fuel blacked at the power stations and the mobilisation of mass pickets to stop the oil and coal lorries. The NUM itself should allocate more resources to the picketing of power stations and challenging those workers who are flouting TUC policy. But that should be a part of the pressure towards all-out industrial action in support of the miners by the trade union movement as a whole — not a substitute for it.
Under the present conditions of the strike the Conference called on February 9 by the Mineworkers Defence Committee takes on an added importance. It is potentially the most important opportunity the support movement will get in the short term to debate the strategy and problems of the strike. This opportunity should not be missed this time. The collection of funds and resources for the strike is vitally important, but the support movement must also have a voice in the conduct of the strike as well. The NUM leadership is running the strike but it will listen to what the support movement — which is now crucial to the strike — has got to say.
There are many different lines being argued. Some urge us to turn to the rank and file, not the TUC; others suggest that the NUM is not organising enough pickets. There is now even a call for the NUM to call a general strike itself — which appears to be one of the most dangerous calls yet, since it would be denounced by the TUC and militants would neither have the protection of their own unions or that of the TUC itself. All these views need arguing out in a national forum, with a policy thrashed out which could then be considered by the NUM leadership.
For our part we cannot see any contradiction between turning to the rank and file and forcing the TUC to act. The official movement is not the property of a few bureaucrats at the top who are looking for peerages. It is the property of the rank and file and we have to ensure it is used for the defence of the miners.
If that is not done we could be faced with an even bigger betrayal than 1926. Then the TUC actually did call a 10 day General Strike in support of the miners, although they then sold it out. This time we must force them to act, and stop them selling it out.
What this raises is the big question: how can the TUC leaders be forced to call such an action?
Victory to the miners! Build solidarity action! Open up a second front against the government! Mass picket the power stations! Recall the TUC! A General Strike to support the miners!
Alan Thornett, 21.1.85